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I. INTRODUCTION
{1}You hop on the World Wide Web ready to do some Internet surfing. You decide to check the scores from
last night's football game. You head to your favorite search engine and then pause . . . "where will the scores
be" you ask yourself. You decide upon ESPN, because you know they have it all when it comes to sports. So,
you type in ESPN and click on the "SEARCH" button. You eagerly await the return of the results to head out
to the ESPN homepage to find out if your alma mater beat the in-state rival in the big Thanksgiving Weekend
match-up. The results return, and the first result the engine returned as matching your search request is the
CNNSI site, not the ESPN site. The second entry in the results appears to be a sporting goods retailer named
Herman. The third seems to be the site for the Ginsu Knife Company. The fourth is some adult site selling
photographs of a "different" sport.
{2}At this point, you become frustrated, consider ending this effort, and getting the local paper. But no, your
allegiance to the school, and lack of a dollar fifty for the Sunday edition, cause you to continue to look for the
search results' entry for the ESPN site. Finally, somewhere around entry twenty-five, you find the site you are
seeking. While you are rewarded because you discover your team beat the big rival in the last five seconds by
kicking a field goal, you still wonder: what happened with that search to cause ESPN to be so low on the
listing of sites matching your search request?
{3}The answer to the question is metatags. While the above is a fictional account, it is useful to illustrate a
very real phenomena on the Internet that is caused in part by metatags. Metatags are hidden codes on
webpages that search engines use to determine what topics a webpage covers. When trademarks are placed in
metatags, such as the inclusion of the ESPN trademark in the example above, the search engine sees that
trademark, considers that site to be related to a search on this trademark, and returns that site in the search
results. In the past two years, a number of trademark owners have become upset by the use of their mark in
metatags of unrelated websites and have turned to the courts to block such use, basing their claims upon
trademark law.[1]
{4}The theories that plaintiffs have advanced include: (1) trademark infringement of registered and
unregistered marks; (2) false advertising; and (3) dilution. These cases pose unique challenges for the courts
because no tangible, real world counterpart to metatags exists, providing no analogy or paradigm for the court
to use in analyzing the claims. This paper evaluates the validity of each of these potential claims resulting
from the use of a trademark in webpage metatags, concluding that trademark law is ill-equipped to address
metatag misuse.
{5}In order to understand the analysis of the legal issues, it is important to first understand what metatags are,

how they are used, and why websites utilize them. This is the focus of section two of this paper. The third
section analyzes current trademark infringement laws and their potential applicability to trademark use in
metatags. The fourth section looks at the claim of false advertising, and the fifth considers the dilution claim
for the use of trademarks in metatags.

II. METATAGS DEFINED
A. What Are Metatags and How Are They Used?
{6}A metatag is part of the webpage programming language that is embedded on a webpage, but never seen
by the end user.[2] There are multiple types of metatags, but for this discussion, the critical metatag type is
the "keyword" metatag.[3] The keyword metatag allows a website creator or operator to specify terms that
describe the site. A search engine then indexes these terms by the use of a "spider."[4] A "spider" crawls the
"web" looking at every website and building an index.[5] The spider often gives priority to the terms in the
metatags when building the index.[6] When a user executes a search with a search engine, the engine reviews
the index that the spider previously generated to determine which sites match the submitted search request.[7]
The search engine then returns all the sites that are found to have terms matching the request.[8]

B. Why Use Metatags?
{7}As of the beginning of 1999, the number of public websites exceeded 2.8 million,[9] with predictions of
the number continuing to double or triple every six months.[10] With this type of volume, a website has a
daunting task to attract users. A website, however, must attract users in order to make money. A website
makes money from users through two means. The first is the opportunity to sell the user the products or
services offered on the site.[11] The second is by selling advertising space on the website to third parties, the
price of which depends on the volume of users that visit the site, regardless of whether the user purchases any
products at the site.[12]
{8}Because of this need to attract users, website operators must market sites, as well as products or services.
[13] Most users who seek information use a search engine to identify the prospective sites that contain the
information they desire. Therefore, to be successful in marketing a website, an operator must design a
marketing strategy that ensures that the search engine will frequently list the site in its search results.
Additionally, it is not enough to be a resulting site from a search. A website needs to be ranked highly on the
list of returned sites because users often fail to go beyond the top ten to twenty sites returned.[14] The
marketing strategy, therefore, must focus both on making the list, and on being at the top. This leads to the
use of metatags.[15]
{9}Webpage developers advocate the use of metatags because they know this is the most effective way to
increase the exposure of the site.[16] This often involves the inclusion of extensive numbers of terms,
variations of a term,[17] and repetitive uses of a term.[18] Realizing the power of the metatag, many website
operators have elected to include terms in the metatags that have nothing to do with the site, simply in an
effort to increase the number of users that visit the site.[19] This is analogous to the Ginsu Knife site in the
fictional scenario at the opening of this article. This increased traffic should result in similarly increased
advertising revenues.
{10}Other operators include trademarks where they have a companion or ancillary product to that of the
trademark owner.[20] This is analogous to the Herman's site in the fictional scenario. Finally, operators in
direct competition with the trademark owner have included the mark in the metatags in an attempt to draw
user traffic away from the competing site.[21] This corresponds to the CNNSI site in the fictional scenario.

{11}Each of these situations certainly conjures feelings of impropriety. Trademark owners whose marks have
been used in this manner feel as though these types of actions are illegal. Regardless, the question remains
whether such metatag "misuse" is illegal.[22] However, not all courts follow this guiding principle.

III. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
{12} The Lanham Act[23] provides protection from trademark infringement in two sections, §§ 32(1) and
43(a)(1)(A). Section 32(1) prohibits the use in commerce of a copy of a registered mark in connection with
the sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services if such use is likely to cause confusion.[24] Section
43(a)(1)(A) provides essentially the same protection for unregistered marks, and is commonly referred to as
unfair competition.[25] The term trademark infringement shall be used herein to refer to both infringement of
registered trademarks and unfair competition.
{13}To prevail in an infringement action, the plaintiff must prove: (1) a copy of a mark was used; (2) the use
was in commerce; (3) the use was in connection with goods or services; and (4) the use is likely to cause
confusion.[26] Of these, the likelihood of confusion element has raised the most discussion in relation to
metatag usage.

A. Use in Commerce for Goods and Services
{14}Before turning to the discussion of likelihood of confusion, it is worth noting briefly the comments of
the court in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci[27] regarding the "use in commerce"
and the "in connection with goods or services" elements in the context of an Internet trademark infringement
action. The court stated that the "use in commerce" element is merely a jurisdictional prerequisite Congress
must establish in order to justify the statute under the Commerce Clause and should be construed very
broadly.[28] With that in mind, the court determined that users must access the Internet via phone lines,
which are part of interstate commerce, and the purpose of a webpage is to allow a world wide audience to
access it.[29] Therefore, a webpage, which encourages world wide access via phone lines, meets the
requirement of "use in commerce."[30]
{15}With regard to "in connection with goods or services," the court determined that the connection can
properly be made with either the alleged infringer's goods or any goods that are advertised on the site.[31]
Therefore, merely selling advertising space is sufficient to bring a web operator under the "in connection with
goods or services" element. The tests for both "use in commerce" and "in connection with goods or services"
are exceedingly broad. Almost all commercial websites will meet these tests, reducing these elements to
minimal importance in the analysis of trademark infringement.

B. Likelihood of Confusion
1. Traditional Multi-Factored Analysis
{16}Since most commercial websites will meet the "use in commerce" and "in connection with goods or
services" elements, it appears that the trademark owner may have a chance at success under the infringement
provisions of the Lanham Act. This brings us to the likelihood of confusion, considered to be the "keystone
of infringement."[32] Each of the federal circuits has adopted different multi-factored tests for determining if
likelihood of confusion exists, though they all overlap.[33] The key factors can be summarized as (1)
similarity of the two marks; (2) the similarity in channels of distribution; (3) the sophistication of the buyers
and the care they are likely to use; (4) the alleged infringer's intent; (5) with noncompetitive goods, whether
buyers would expect the mark owner to expand into the field occupied by the alleged infringer; and (6)

evidence of actual confusion.[34]
{17}The nature of these factors points out that this type of test does not fit well with the concept of metatag
misuse.[35] Consider the CNNSI case from the fictional scenario, which would appear to offer the strongest
infringement possibility because the two sites are direct competitors. In that case, the ESPN trademark is
included in the metatag, but does not appear on the webpage. How does that apply to the analysis of the
similarity of the marks? If one were looking at the programming code, the marks would be considered
identical, yet the user has never been faced with seeing two conflicting marks. Furthermore, when the user
goes to the CNNSI site, it is clear to the user that is not the ESPN site and there is no mention of ESPN.
{18}The single thread upon which to tie likelihood of confusion comes down to the inclusion of a site in a
listing of search results potentially containing hundreds or thousands of sites, where the list was generated
from a request that included a trademark. Given the nature of search engine results, even an unsophisticated
user is not likely to be confused into believing that the site is connected to ESPN simply because the site was
returned from a search request on ESPN.[36] It appears that the metatag only confused the search engine.[37]
{19}In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles ("Welles I"),[38] one of the few cases to address metatag
trademark infringement, the defendant used the trademark both in the metatags and on the site, removing the
difficulty posed by the hidden metatag use.[39] In considering the likelihood of confusion, the court
enumerated the eight-factor test for the circuit, then proceeded to dismiss the test.[40] The court noted that
the test was merely a guideline to be used in evaluating consumer confusion, and that this case was "not a
standard trademark case and [did] not lend itself to the systematic application of the eight factors."[41] The
judge, however, determined that the defendant had a fair use defense that negated the need for determining
the likelihood of confusion,[42] leaving open the question of how to evaluate the likelihood of confusion
relating to metatags.
{20}The Welles I court is correct. The multi-factor test is inapplicable in a case of metatag misuse. Therefore,
if we return to a common sense approach to likelihood of confusion, it must fail. It is unlikely that a
consumer will be confused to origin, sponsorship or affiliation based solely on the fact that a site was
returned in a search result.[43] This misuse of a trademark "has the feel of a 'bad actor,'"[44] however, it
simply does not amount to trademark infringement where the likelihood of confusion is measured under
traditional multi-factored tests.

2. Initial Interest Confusion
{21}The only circuit court that has addressed the issue of metatag misuse is the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.[45] Brookfield was a
preliminary injunction case where a video store used the mark MOVIEBUFF in the metatags of its website
and as its domain name.[46] The owner of the mark MOVIEBUFF is a software company that provides a
database of movie statistics.[47] The court conducted the multi-factor test for the domain name use and held
that mark owner had demonstrated that it was likely to prevail on its claim of trademark infringement.[48]
{22}Then, turning to the metatag use, as had the Welles I court,[49] the Brookfield court enumerated the
eight-factor test for the circuit.[50] However, rather than follow Welles I and dismiss the test as inapplicable
in this context, the Brookfield court specifically stated that the test was not meant to be an exhaustive list of
factors and that the court must be cautious of applying such a test too rigidly to Internet cases.[51]
Furthermore, the court concluded its consideration of the multi-factored test, stating that the "emerging
technologies require a flexible approach."[52]
{23}With the foundation laid to depart from the traditional multi-factored analysis, the court announced its
new standard for metatag cases - initial interest confusion.[53] Initial interest confusion is consumer

confusion that exists for only a short period of time and that results in the consumer being attracted to the
person or company misusing the trademark of another. This confusion is quickly dispelled once the consumer
reaches the location and has clear evidence that it is not related to the trademark owner. Thus, the confusion
at issue is the confusion that caused the consumer to go to the trademark misuser's location, not the traditional
confusion to source of goods or services.[54]
{24}The court analogized the metatag misuse scenario to highway billboards. For example, Store Y places a
highway sign that advertises that Store X is at Exit 7, when Store X is actually at Exit 8 and Store Y is at Exit
7. The consumer, in search of Store X, exits at Exit 7, but does not find Store X and instead finds Store Y. The
consumer, realizing that Store Y is similar to Store X, and knowing that the two stores are not related, elects
to shop Store Y, rather than continue to search for Store X. Therefore, this issue is no longer one of
confusion; rather, the issue becomes Store Y misappropriating the goodwill of Store X.[55] Based on this
logic, the court held that the inclusion of the mark in the metatags constituted trademark infringement.[56]
{25}While on the surface, initial interest confusions appears to provide courts with a legitimate avenue to
find infringement in metatag cases, the logic of this approach breaks down under greater scrutiny. First, this
logic depends upon the web user actually going to the site misusing the trademark in the metatags. Secondly,
the user needs to be confused at the time he goes to that site. In a pure metatag misuse situation, consisting of
a situation where there is no visible use of the mark, neither is likely to be true.
{26}Users are accustomed to receiving search results that have volumes of unrelated and often irrelevant
sites. Because of this, users sift through the listing to find the site they actually desire. If the site misusing the
trademark in the metatags has made no visible reference to the mark, the user will skim past that result and
never go to the misuser's site. When put into the context of the highway analogy given by the Brookfield
court, the trademark misuser may have succeeded in obtaining rights to put up a billboard by using someone
else's mark, but the billboard itself correctly identifies the advertising party. If the highway traveler is not
interested in the actual advertising party, he simply continues down the highway. The traveler has not been
deceived into believing that the location he seeks is at that exit. The only initial confusion was on the part of
the person granting the rights to put up the billboards. In the alternative, when viewed in the web context,
only the search engine was confused, not the user. This analysis changes if coupled with visible misuse of the
mark, as presented in Brookfield. With a visible misuse of the mark, the user does have reason to pause upon
that particular result in the listing and to possibly go to that site.
{27}Secondly, if the user knows that the site is not related to the searched-for mark and still elects to visit the
site, this is not done based on initial interest confusion. The user reviewed the description presented by the
search engine that contained no reference to the trademark and knew that it was an unrelated site. Choosing
to visit the site at that stage is not done based on confusion. Therefore, there is no initial interest confusion in
a pure metatag scenario, as opposed to metatag misuse coupled with visible misuse.[57]
{28}Given the lack of confusion that results from a pure metatag case, the Brookfield result appears to be
driven not by the illegality of the metatag trademark use, but rather by the visible trademark infringement
coupled with the metatag trademark use. The court indicates that the result would be the same regardless of
the visible use.[58] Translating this approach to pure metatag trademark use, the courts are abdicating their
responsibility to assess the legality of the trademark use and are being driven by a general sense of right and
wrong.
{29}Although the Brookfield analysis and invocation of initial interest confusion is flawed, it is the current
law of the Ninth Circuit. One district court in the Ninth Circuit has already been faced with a metatag case
under the Brookfield law, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc. ("Welles II").[59] The Welles II
opinion has highlighted the malleability of the initial interest confusion test.

{30}In Welles II, the court first noted that a finding of initial interest confusion alone does not mandate a
finding of infringement.[60] Then, the court distinguished the cases cited by Brookfield as having other
findings indicating wrongful conduct on the part of the infringing party and suggesting that such other
conduct may be necessary to find infringement based on initial interest confusion.[61] In preparation for
finding no initial interest confusion, the Welles II court then sites the Brookfield language mandating
flexibility in applying trademark infringement test to emerging technology.[62] With this interpretation of the
Brookfield opinion, the Welles II court found that Playboy has failed to show any wrongful conduct, and
therefore, there was no basis for an infringement claim.[63] The Welles II court then stated that Welles has a
fair use defense, showing that fair use is a valid defense to both initial interest confusion and traditional
confusion to the source of goods and services.[64]
{31}The door opened by Brookfield for finding infringement based upon initial interest confusion has been
knocked off its hinges by Welles II. Welles II shows that the courts can manipulate the initial interest
confusion test to suit their morality, and that it does not provide a test that can be used to provide judicial
consistency in application of the Lanham Act.

C. Damages
{32}Metatags play a greater role in trademark infringement, where the site uses visual depictions of the
trademark in addition to the metatag because metatag use clearly points to willful conduct, providing for a
greater award of damages under Section 35 of the Lanham Act.[65] In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus
International, Inc.,[66] AsiaFocus used the Playboy and Playmate marks on its site, in its domain name, email address, and metatags.[67] Additionally, the court had evidence of actual confusion.[68] The court held
that AsiaFocus had infringed on the Playboy trademarks.[69] When considering damages, the AsiaFocus
court awarded damages based upon section 35(c)(2), which provides that willful use of a counterfeit mark
entitles the owner to damages of up to $1,000,000 per mark per category of goods sold.[70] The court noted
at several points in the discussion that the conduct of AsiaFocus was willful, which was illustrated by the
"purposeful tactic of embedding the trademarks . . . in the hidden computer source code."[71] The court
found the use to be sufficiently broad and blatant to justify the award of the full statutory amount, $1,000,000.
[72]
{33}Based solely upon the misuse of a trademark in a hidden metatag, it appears that a trademark owner
should not succeed in establishing a likelihood of confusion. However, if coupled with traditional, visible
misuse of the trademark, a court may seize upon the feeling of a "bad actor," and open the doors to large
statutory damages.

IV. FALSE ADVERTISING
{34}Section 43(a)(1)(B) provides protection from false advertising to trademark owners.[73] To succeed on a
false advertising claim, the trademark owner must prove "at least the following three elements: (1)
[d]efendants made false or deceptive advertisements or representation to customers; (2) those advertisements
deceived a significant portion of the consuming public; and (3) [the trademark owner was] injured by
[d]efendants' conduct."[74] As this test illustrates, the trademark owner does not have to establish a
likelihood of confusion, the element that weighs against a successful infringement claim. To date, no court
has discussed the false advertising claim in relation to a metatag misuse.[75]
{35}While the removal of the requirement of proving likelihood of confusion seemingly benefits the
trademark owner, such glory is short lived. The trademark owner must now show that a significant portion of
the consuming public was actually deceived by the use of the metatags. Given the same reasons that point to
a failure to establish likelihood of confusion in an infringement action, it seems even more remote that a

trademark owner could show actual deception.[76] Furthermore, the form of the metatag fails to conform to
the expectation of a commercial advertisement or promotion because it is never seen by the user.[77] For
these reasons, a claim of false advertising will be rendered ineffective.

V. TRADEMARK DILUTION
{36}Prior to January 1996, when the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("the Act")[78] was signed into
law by the President, the federal trademark law had no protection for trademarks based upon dilution.[79]
The dilution provision provides the trademark owner another cause of action that is not dependent upon the
likelihood of confusion.[80] Further, this action attempts to preserve the distinctiveness of the owner's
trademark, as opposed to the other trademark laws, which have a dual purpose of protecting an owner's
goodwill in the mark and protecting the public from confusion, deception, and mistake.[81] From this general
view, it appears that dilution may provide an even stronger basis for attacking metatag trademark misuse than
a traditional infringement action.
{37}Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act creates a right of action for a trademark owner when the owner's
famous mark has been diluted by the use of the mark by a separate party.[82] In order to prevail in a claim of
dilution, the plaintiff must prove that:
(1) the mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of the mark in commerce;
(3) the defendant's use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of the
mark dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify and
distinguish goods and services.[83]
{38}Of these elements, those that pose the greatest challenge for application to metatags are commercial
use[84] and dilution. If the mark had no fame or notoriety, the webpage operator would not be including the
mark in the metatags because such use would not attract more users to the site. For the same reasoning, it is a
given that the use of the mark as a metatag post-dates the mark reaching famous status. That is not to say that
in a lawsuit such defenses would not be raised. Such arguments, however, would not be credible when used
in the context of a metatag for a site that makes no explicit mention of the trademark.

A. Commercial Use
{39}The Act characterizes use in commerce for goods as the placement of the mark "on the goods or their
containers or the displays associated therewith . . . or if [such placement is] impracticable, then on documents
associated with the goods or their sale, and the goods are sold or transported in commerce. . . ."[85] The Act
similarly classifies use in commerce for services to occur "when [the mark] is used or displayed in the sale or
advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce. . . ."[86] Pursuant to these definitions, the
trademark must be displayed on or in connection with the goods or services being sold.
{40}With this definition in mind, consider the website that only provides information to users, but has
embedded in its metatags a famous trademark to attract traffic to its site. It does not mention or use the mark
in the visible display of the site. Does this amount to commercial use? Because it is never displayed to the
user, it is hard to fit this situation under the Act's characterization of use in commerce. The web operator is
not using the mark in any visible manner.
{41}The courts have not had the opportunity to consider this exact question. But, in Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen,[87] the court was faced with a similar challenge to the commercial use
standard under the Lanham Act's dilution provisions. In Panavision, Toeppen was a cybersquatter[88] who
had registered the domain name Panavision.com.[89] The webpage simply displayed pictures of Pana,

Illinois.[90] Panavision, upon discovering that Toeppen had registered the name, sent him a cease and desist
letter. Toeppen then attempted to sell the name to Panavision International for $13,000.[91]
{42}Toeppen challenged the district court's finding that he was using the mark in commerce.[92] He argued
that "a user who types in Panavision.com, but who sees no reference to the plaintiff Panavision on [his]
webpage, is not likely to conclude the webpage is related in any way to the plaintiff, Panavision."[93] The
court, rejecting Toeppen's argument, stated that it did "not matter that he did not attach the marks to a
product."[94] He was seeking to trade on the value of the mark by attempting to sell the domain name to
Panavision, and that met the commercial use requirement.[95]
{43}It appears that the court was motivated to find a commercial use here because of the bad intentions of
Toeppen, though those intentions in no way met the requirements of the Act.[96] Likewise, in a metatag case
where there is no visual display of the mark, it is likely that the court will be inclined to find a commercial
use when the trademark use was inspired by bad intentions. Given that the two main reasons for using such
marks are commercial in origin, to sell products and to sell advertising space, such use will clearly fit within
the exceedingly broad parameters set by the Panavision court for commercial use on the Internet -- to trade
on the value of the mark.[97]

B. Dilution of the Mark
{44}The Act defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous
mark and other parties; or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."[98] This definition has been
described as providing "little help in determining what the 'lessening' of distinctiveness means. . . ."[99] With
the limited guidance provided by the statute, it has been suggested that metatag analysis may be conducted
based upon either the dilution by blurring test or the dilution by tarnishment test, both imported into federal
law from state dilution laws.[100]

1. Blurring
{45}Blurring results from other uses of the mark that do not create confusion, but that somehow "diminish
the ability of the mark to trigger an immediate association between the mark and its owner."[101] In the
metatag context, this type of disassociation is hard to establish. The user will not see the famous mark in the
listing of the search results, nor on the webpage, should the user visit the page. While the user may wonder
why this site has been included in the list, this does not lead to disassociation in the context presented by
metatag misuse. As one court has noted, a search based upon a trademark can generate 800 to 1,000 matches.
[102] This suggests that users are all too familiar with the discrepancy between the sites the user was
targeting and the results of a search, and that users accept many irrelevant results.[103] With this type of user
experience and expectation, the mere inclusion of the site on the list of search results does not generate
blurring of the trademark.

2. Tarnishment
{46}Dilution by tarnishment occurs when the "trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality, or is
portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering beliefs about the owner of its
products."[104] The metatag scenario providing the opportunity for such a claim exists when a pornographic
site has used a famous mark, such as the fourth site returned in the fictional scenario in the introduction of
this article.
{47}In the context of the fictional scenario, it seems clear that ESPN has been tarnished by the adult site

including the mark among the metatags for the site. Merely being linked, however, is not sufficient to
establish dilution under the tarnishment test. ESPN would also have to establish that the adult site's use
"evoked unflattering beliefs" about ESPN, which would be difficult to prove.[105] As discussed above with
blurring, the site does not use the mark, and users have become accustomed to many irrelevant sites being
included in search results.[106]

3. Other Tests
{48}While it seems improbable that a challenge to metatags can survive under either the blurring or
tarnishment tests, the courts are not restricted to these approaches. As noted above, these state law doctrines
have been imported to the federal law because of lack of guidance on how to determine when dilution occurs.
Given that the Internet is a unique, independent entity, and that there is no real-world equivalent to metatags,
it seems likely that the courts will fashion a new test for this medium. The Ninth Circuit has started to blaze
this trail in Panavision.
{49}The Panavision court explicitly rejected the use of blurring or tarnishing for determining if a domain
name registration diluted the value of a trademark.[107] Citing the district court opinion, the court notes that
dilution has occurred when the use "diminishe[s] the capacity of the Panavision marks to identify and
distinguish Panavision's goods and services on the Internet."[108] Furthermore, the court states that requiring
the user to wade through hundreds of websites in search of the trademark owner's site dilutes the value of the
trademark.[109]
{50}Applying this dilution approach to the metatag situation, a strong argument can be made that the mark
has been diluted. For every site that uses the trademark in the metatag, the number of sites returned from a
search is increased. Therefore, the user must wade through a higher number of sites, increasing the likelihood
that the user will become frustrated and quit the search before finding the site of the trademark owner.
{51}While this approach holds more promise for establishing liability, the realities of the situation logically
oppose such a result. The Internet user community has become accustomed to the inadequacies of the search
engine and search results numbering in the thousands. Yes, wading through the site listing is quite frustrating,
but it is hard to convert that frustration into a lessening of the capacity of a mark to distinguish goods or
services, especially when the mark is never visually depicted in reference to the diluting user. Regardless of
the factual realities, courts may be willing to stretch the statutory language by fashioning a new test that
exceeds the bounds of the literal language because the misuse of metatags simply seems unfair. What this
situation really begs for is a market solution, such as the yellow pages of the Internet, rather than a "judicial
stretching" of the law.[110]

VI. CONCLUSION
{52}It should be difficult for a trademark owner to establish a cause of action under the Lanham Act because
of the following requirements: (1) the lack of any visual connection between the trademark and the webpage
misusing the trademark; and (2) the common user experience of receiving many irrelevant sites from search
requests. The situation of pure metatag misuse fails to meet the statutory requirements for infringement, false
advertising, or dilution. The inclusion of another's trademarks in a webpage's metatag, however, reeks of
impropriety, which may be enough to provoke the commercial morality of the courts, as shown by the
Brookfield opinion. So provoked, courts may continue to stretch the trademark laws to encompass such
actions.
{53}This "judicial stretching" should more likely occur under a claim of dilution, rather than under
infringement because dilution is more concerned with protecting the owner's value in the trademark; whereas,

infringement focuses more on the protection of the public. While dilution appears the more likely candidate
for stretching, the courts have not shown a desire to do this thus far. Rather, the courts seem to prefer
stretching trademark infringement law to the point of breaking. Neither approach to expanding the trademark
laws to encompass metatag misuse, however, stands on solid statutory ground.
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